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The Effect of Comparative Fault on
California Contribution/
Indemnification Rights: How to
Employ and Avoid the New
Tortious Quicksand
ROBERT L. SIMMONS, P.C.*
This article discusses the efffect of comparative fault principles
upon contribution rights in California, including the somewhat
bizarre impact on settlement and releases between the plaintiff
and one of several joined concurrent tortfeasors. It emphasizes
decisions and tactics that should be made by litigators in re-
sponse to a variety of important contribution issues.
Comparative fault has, for the most part, been absorbed into
California court law with only minor confusion and trauma.
There is one area, however, where both the confusion and the
trauma have been considerable. This concerns the effect compar-
ative fault principles have on the right of a defendant to obtain a
contribution or indemnification judgment against another co-de-
fendant and whether that right can be frustrated by a settlement
between the latter and plaintiff.
This article presents legal conclusions and tactical advice based
upon the newly developed California case and statute laws and
the author's litigation experience concerning these issues. Simple
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law. The author is
grateful to his research assistant, Joseph Ellsworth, for his invaluable contribution
to the preparation of this article.
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hypothetical case situations are presented as a framework for
these legal conclusions and tactical advice.
PLAINTIFF SUES DEFENDANTS "A" AND "B" AS JOINT AND
CONCURRENT TORTFEASORS
Problem I: After deliberation, the jury returns special verdicts
finding that plaintiff suffered general and special damages totaling
$100,000.00; that the plaintiff was 10% at fault in causing those
damages, defendant A 80% at fault, and defendant B 10% at fault.
How much of the verdict sum may plaintiff collect and from
whom?
Answer To Problem I: Plaintiff may collect $90,000.00 from either
defendant ($100,000.00 minus $10,000.00 measuring plaintiff's 10%
fault).
Summary Of Law: The comparative fault rule has not repealed
joint and several liability principles that permit a plaintiff to re-
cover the net judgment from any one of the joined defendants
who is found by the jury to be at fault for plaintiff's loss.' And if
the plaintiff chooses, he may collect the entire amount from the
co-defendant whom the jury has concluded owes only 10% of the
total fault.2
Problem II: Suppose plaintiff collects upon execution the entire
net judgment of $90,000.00 from defendant B, who is found by the
jury to owe but 10% of the total fault. May B compel A to
reimburse B for part of the judgment amount? If so, how much
must A contribute to B and how should B assert its claim?
Solution To Problem II: The joint and concurrent tortfeasor co-
defendant, B, may assert a right to equitable indemnification from
A and obtain a judgment against A for $80,000.00. Equitable in-
demnification compels contribution from a joint and several
tortfeasor co-defendant proportionate with both parties' fault per-
centages. Thus, B, owing 10% of fault but forced to pay $90,000.00
at plaintiffs election, is entitled to indemnification from A for
$80,000.00, the money equivalent of A's fault.
The common law rule of contribution as well as the prior rule in
California requires a 50/50 allocation of the judgment between the
1. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
2. Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (1980); State v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1981).
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joint and concurrent tortfeasor defendants. 3 This is so even
though the co-defendant who is forced to pay the judgment may
have been only slightly at fault, while the co-defendant's fault
may have been substantial. Thus, in non-comparative fault states,
defendant B, responsible for 10% of total fault, is entitled to a
contribution judgment from A of only $45,000.00 (50% of the
$90,000.00 judgment).
But comparative fault in California has abolished this terrible
result and permits equitable indemnification in proportion to the
judgment. Thus, as between joint and concurrent tortfeasor de-
fendants, each shall bear the loss in proportion to his fault.4
PLAINTIFF SUES ONLY ONE OF MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS
Problem III: Suppose plaintiff elects, for tactical or other reasons,
to sue B only. May B implead A and obtain a judgment of partial
indemnification to the extent of $80,000.00?
Solution To Problem III: Co-defendant B may compel joinder of
joint and concurrent tortfeasor A as a. co-defendant and assert a
cause of action against him for partial indemnification. B's mo-
tion to the court for leave to join A as a new party defendant must
be granted.
Summary Of Law: The California Supreme Court decided in the
American Motorcycle Association case that comparative fault
principles could be equitably applied as between joint and con-
current tortfeasors only if one of the latter, if sued separately, was
given the right to compel joinder of all others who potentially
shared in the total fault. Writing for the majority, Justice Tobri-
ner said:
Accordingly, we conclude that under the governing statutory provisions a
defendant is generally authorized to file a cross-complaint against a con-
current tortfeasor for partial indemnity on a comparative fault basis, even
when such concurrent tortfeasor has not been named a defendant in the
original complaint. 5
3. City and County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802
(1958); Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962), Packard v. Whitten,
274 A.2d 169 (Me. 1971).
4. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899,
146 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978); Parker v. Morton, 117 Cal. App. 3d 751, 173 Cal. Rptr. 197
(1981).
5. 20 Cal. 3d at 607, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
Tactical Advice: A plaintiff may gain three advantages by elect-
ing to sue but one of two or more joint and concurrent tortfeasors:
1. He avoids a possible sympathy reduction of the jury award
by suing a "target" defendant (e.g., major corporation, truck
line) and excluding from the case one or more of the pro-
spective defendants with whom the jury might empathize
(e.g., corporate employee, truck driver). Experienced plain-
tiffs' lawyers know that a mixture of "deep pockets" and
"small pockets" defendants often produces a "medium pock-
et" award;
2. Even though the lone defendant will be able to implead the
excluded tortfeasor for partial indemnification under the
American Motorcycle Association case and introduce evi-
dence showing the latter's shared fault, the jury is likely to
view the impleaded defendant as the target of the im-
pleader, not the plaintiff, and the size of the verdict will not
be affected. Further, proof of the impleaded defendant's
fault may reduce the percentage of fault which the jury as-
signs to plaintiff himself, increasing the net verdict amount
which the plaintiff may then collect from the impleading
defendant;
3. By limiting the number of sued defendants, plaintiff avoids
the litigation bruises stemming from "gang tackling." Coun-
sel for multiple defendants can enormously increase their
effectiveness if they can avoid one-upmanship impulses long
enough to plan and carry out a joint defense.
The defendant's response to plaintiffs non-joinder strategy is to
implead by cross-complaints all third parties who may even po-
tentially share in the fault that caused plaintiff's injury. "Good
faith" should be defense counsels' only restriction on a free-
wheeling joinder effort. It is usually a matter of simple mathe-
matics. The more defendants there are to share in the percentage
distribution of fault, the smaller will be the percentage which the
jury may allocate to the impleading defendant.
EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON CONTRIUTION/INDEmNITY RIGHTS
Problem IV: Suppose that prior to or during trial, A settles with
the plaintiff for $20,000.00 and is dismissed from the case. Sup-
pose, further, that the jury's net verdict against B is $70,000.00 (to-
tal damages of $100,000.00 less plaintiff's 10% fault and less the
$20,000.00 settlement). Can B obtain a contribution/partial indem-
nification judgment from A either under B's cross-complaint
against A in the same suit or under a separate suit for this
purpose?
776
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Solution To Problem IV: B must pay the entire net verdict of
$70,000.00 and can recover nothing from A by way of contribution.
This is true even though, had evidence of A's fault been permitted
at trial, the jury would have found A to be 80% at fault for plain-
tiff's damages and B only 10% at fault for them. But no evidence
of A's fault will be presented to the jury since, using procedures
set forth in the recently enacted California Civil Procedure Code
section 877.6, A will have obtained a complete dismissal from the
suit before a verdict is returned.6
Summary Of Law: California law is clear about the right of a
joint and severally liable defendant to avoid all contribution and
partial indemnification liability to a co-defendant by settling with
the plaintiff. California Civil Procedure Code section 877(b) is un-
ambiguous on the subject:
It [a good faith settlement] shall discharge the tortfeasor to whom it is
given from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
7
Some speculated that the statutory rule was modified by adop-
tion of comparative fault. It seems logical that if, as is now the
case, a jury was required to apportion percentage fault among all
joint and concurrent tortfeasors, one who settled with plaintiff/
claimant would no longer be let off the hook. He should be re-
quired to pay contribution to the non-settling defendant who is
forced to pay the entire judgment. The settling defendant's con-
tribution should be measured by his fault percentage times the
total damages attributable to all defendants, less the settlement
payment.8
6. CAL. CMv. PRoC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1981) became effective in 1980
and provides for a court determination, after a hearing, that a "good faith" settle-
ment was or was not made. Any party claiming settlement was not in "good faith"
has the burden of proof. Upon a determination that the settlement was in "good
faith," the statute provides that all claims for contribution against the settlor are
barred.
7. CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 877(b) (West 1980).
8. For example, assume the jury found plaintiff's total damages to be $100,000;
that plaintiff was 10% at fault, settling defendant 80% at fault and non-settling de-
fendant 10% at fault; also assume that the settlement amount paid plaintiff was
$20,000. Under the view that comparative fault altered the non-contribution rule of
CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 877(b), the settling defendant would pay his co-defendant
the difference between $20,000 and 80% of $80,000, or $44,000. But see Baget v.
Shepard, 128 Cal. App. 3d 433, 180 Cal. Rptr. 386 (1982). This court has interpreted
CAT. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877(a) to mean that the reduction of plaintiff's claim
against the non-settling defendant is by the percentage of the settling defendant's
fault, not by the amount appearing on the release. The court said the settling de-
fendant's fault should be determined during the later trial. It is highly questiona-
But neither reason nor logic was destined to play any part. The
California Supreme Court opted to retain the Draconian no-con-
tribution rule rather than engraft an exception because of com-
parative fault. Said the court in American Motorcycle
Association:
We conclude that from a realistic perspective the legislative policy under-
lying the provision dictates that a tortfeasor who has entered into a "good
faith" settlement... with the plaintiff must alpo be discharged from any
claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a con-
current tortfeasor.9
TACTICAL TIPS FOR NoN-SETrLNG TORTFEASORS
Problem V: What can a joint tortfeasor do to prevent one or more
other joint tortfeasors from extinguishing the former's contribu-
tion/indemnification rights and subjecting him to a larger liability
than his fault justifies?
Short of settling with plaintiff himselfio there are two tactics
available to the non-settling joint tortfeasor that will preserve his
contribution or indemnity rights if supporting evidence can be
found.
Assert a Claim for Total Indemnification
If the joint tortfeasor can prove that he has a right to be totally
indemnified from another joint tortfeasor because of a contract in-
demnification clause or because he is only secondarily liable to
plaintiff while the indemnitor is primarily liable, then he, the in-
demnitee, is entitled to recover every dollar of his payout to plain-
tiff. His rights do not rest on contribution principles and,
therefore, are unaffected by a settlement between plaintiff and
the indemnitor joint tortfeasor, by the bar of California Civil Pro-
cedure Code section 877.11
Assert the Settlement is Collusive
When a settlement is reached prior to trial and the non-settling
ble whether the California Supreme Court will allow this decision to stand. There
is no doubt that the decision produces an equitable result, but it does obvious vio-
lence to a clear, unambiguous statutory phrase. One of the cardinal principles of
statutory construction is if the language is clear, it should be applied rather than
interpreted.
9. 20 Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198.
10. A settlement will be advantageous to a joint tortfeasor whenever it can be
achieved for an amount less than (a) the probable fees and expenses incurred at
trial, plus (b) the median percentage of fault that a jury will probably allocate to
the settlor defendant times the median total damages which the jury will probably
award plaintiff.
11. Rollins v. State, 14 Cal. App. 3d 160, 92 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1971); Herrero v. At-
kinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964).
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defendant seeks indemnification, the liability of the dismissed co-
defendant may not be indicated to the court. Thus, where good
faith is an issue,. the parties may have to present evidence con-
cerning liability factors relevant to the settlement. This evidence
would be limited to considerations that were present at the time
of the settlement.
A release obtained in bad faith is contrary to the policy of the
law and is, therefore, an illegal contract. If it is the product of col-
lusion between the plaintiff and settlor both are in pari delicto
and barred from judicial aid.
The settlement becomes collusive when it is designed to injure
the interests of an absent tortfeasor. Although many kinds of col-
lusive injury are possible, the most obvious and frequent one is
that created by an unreasonably cheap settlement.12 This is be-
cause a non-settling defendant has a financial stake in the amount
of settlement and, thus, a justifiable interest in the question of
good faith.
SUMMARY OF LAw SUPPORTING NON-SETTLOR'S "GOOD FAr"
CHALLENGE TO THE SETTLEMENT
California Civil Procedure Code section 877, new section 877.6,
and supporting authorities' 3 make it clear that a settlement be-
tween plaintiff and one joint tortfeasor bars contribution/partial
indemnification rights only if it was a "good faith" settlement. If
it was not executed in good faith insofar as it affects the non-set-
tling joint tortfeasor, this party retains an unimpaired right to ob-
tain partial indemnification from the settling party. The amount
of indemnification would be the excess of the net plaintiff's judg-
ment that the non-settling party is compelled to pay over his pro-
portionate percentage liability.14 The issue of "good faith"
presents a question of fact for the court's determination, and may
be raised by any interested party upon a noticed motion.15
12. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1972).
13. Fisher v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980);
Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1976); Lareau
v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 44 Cal. App. 3d 783, 118 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975).
14. River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 103 Cal.
Rptr. 498 (1972).
15. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 877.6 (West Supp. 1981).

